Purchase Money Resulting Trusts in West Virginia by Black, Donald F.
Volume 39 Issue 1 Article 7 
December 1932 
Purchase Money Resulting Trusts in West Virginia 
Donald F. Black 
West Virginia University College of Law 
Follow this and additional works at: https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr 
 Part of the Property Law and Real Estate Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Donald F. Black, Purchase Money Resulting Trusts in West Virginia, 39 W. Va. L. Rev. (1932). 
Available at: https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol39/iss1/7 
This Student Note is brought to you for free and open access by the WVU College of Law at The Research 
Repository @ WVU. It has been accepted for inclusion in West Virginia Law Review by an authorized editor of The 
Research Repository @ WVU. For more information, please contact ian.harmon@mail.wvu.edu. 
STUDENT NOTES
probably open to serious question; but be that as it may, the fact
remains that it is not justified by the present state of our law.
Doubtless business standards can be elevated by judicial deci-
sions, but the process of elevation must be well considered, grad-
ual, and not too far in advance of ordinary business customs.
On the other hand, it is scarcely necessary to suggest that the
Williamson case falls far short of the orthodox ethical standard
for domestic relations. Consequently, the West Virginia law oil
the subject of fiduciary or confidential relations is in a decidedly
unsatisfactory state.
-GEORGE W. McQU(AN.
PuRcHAsE MoNEY RESULTING TRUSTS IN WEST VIRGINIA. -
Purchase money resulting trusts have been a very fertile field of
litigation in West Virginia. Due to the very considerable num-
ber of cases decided, the West Virginia decisions mark out for
this jurisdiction the applicability of most of the rules developed
in this branch of the law. The decisions are for the most part in
conformity with the weight of American authority. The circum-
stances under which this doctrine has been invoked and applied
may be roughly divided into two classes; first, situations wherein
the purchaser and grantee are strangers, and secondly, wherein
they are related by blood or marriage.
Where, upon a purchase of property, the conveyance of the
legal title is taken in the name of one person, while the considera-
tion is given or paid by another, the parties being strangers to
each other, a resulting trust arises by virtue of the transaction.1
The party who pays the consideration becomes in law a cestui
que trust while the party receiving legal title is trustee. This
rule is founded on the natural presumption that the person who
furnishes the purchase money intends the purchase to be for his
own benefit. This presumption is rebuttable by the grantee.
The evidence must be clear and unequivocal.' Mere admission
made by the party holding legal title that he holds the property
'Pumphrey v. Brown, 5 W. Va. 107 (1872); Despard v. Despard, 53 W.
Va. 443, 44 S. E. 448 (1903) ; Smith v. Patton, 12 W. Va. 541 (1878).
2Pumphrey v. Brown, supra n. 1.
Logan, Walton, Adm'rs. v. Pritt, 93 W. Va. 375, 116 S. E. 759 (1923).
4 Cassaday v. Cassaday, 74 W. Va. 53, 81 S. E. 829 (1914).
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in trust is not enough.' The claimant by resulting trust is not a
competent witness to prove payment of the purchase money to
or through a decedent who died seized of the property nor is his
wife.6
The payment must have been made before or contempor-
aneously with the conveyance' or the claimant become bound by
valid contract at that time to pay the price.8 The grantee may
show that the nominal purchaser advanced the money as a loan
to him and conversely a party may show that the grantee advanced
the price as a loan to him.' No agreement to pay, or actual pay-
ment on, the price subsequent to the conveyance will raise the
trust.'  The payment may be made in money or money's equiva-
lent, as by trading land or other valuables for the property con-
veyed.'
One claimant may pay only part of the price or several
parties may jointly contribute to the price, in which case a bene-
ficial interest results to each proportionate to the contribution
made.' Some jurisdictions require the claimant to have paid an
aliquot part of the price." West Virginia requires only that the
amount paid be definitely established.1 ' The interest claimed by
the cestui and the exact part of the whole price which he paid
must be clearly established.' The conveyance must not have been
made for the purpose of defrauding creditors." *Where the
claimant has been tardy in asserting his interest and creditors of
the grantee seek to subject the property to the grantee's debts
the claimant is not estopped unless it was his duty to speak or
'Supra n. 4.
0 Hummel v. Marshall, 95 W. Va. 42, 120 S. E. 164 (1923).
7 Moore v. Mustoe, 47 W. Va. 549, 35 S. E. 871 (1900).
8 Moss v. Moss, 88 W. Va. 135, 106 S. E. 429 (1921) ; Cleavenger v. Felton,
46 W. Va. 249, 33 S. E. 117 (1899).
'Raines v. Raines, 96 W. Va. 65, 122 S. E. 437 (1924); Harris v. Elliott,
45 W. Va. 245, 32 S. E. 176 (1898).
Tichnell v. Tichnell, 74 W. Va. 237, 81 S. E. 978 (1914); Bright v.
Knight, 35 W. Va. 41, 13 S. E. 63 (1891); Smith v. Turley, 32 W. Va. 14,
9 S. E. 46 (1889).
n Seiler v. Mohn, 37 W. Va. 507, 16 S. E. 496 (1892).
M2 urry v. Sell, 23 W. Va. 475 (1884); Weinrich v. Wolf, 24 W. Va. 299
(1884); Heiskell v. Powell, 23 W. Va. 717 (1884).
Scott, Besulting Trusts Arising Upon the Purchase of Land (1927) 40
HARv. L. REy. 669.
"Currence v. Ward, 43 W. Va. 367, 27 S. E. 329 (1897).
Shaffer v. Petty, 30 W. Va. 248, 4 S. E. 278 (1887). A bill is demurrable
that does not state what part of the entire purchase money was paid by the
purchaser claiming a resulting trust. Watts Brothers & Co. v. Frith, 79 W.
Va. 89, 91 S. E. 402 (1916).
"McClintock v, Loisseau, 31 W. Va. 865, 8 S. E, 612 (1888).
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act and he has by his silence, false statement, or refusal to act
intentionally misled the creditor to his detriment."'
Where one person stands in such relation to another that
there is an obligation, moral or legal, to provide for the other, a
purchase or conveyance in the name of the latter party will be
presumed to be made in discharge of that duty, as for example,
where the purchaser stands in loco parentis to the grantee." A
gift and not a resulting trust is the presumption in such ease.
Thus where the pergon to whom title is made is child or wife of
the purchaser there is no presumption of resulting trust but to the
contrary a gift is presumed.1 This rule has been extended to
include grandchildren where the parents are dead, the mother of
the purchaser, nephews, nieces and adopted children.' Some
cases have extended this rule to include gifts to a son or daughter
over twenty-one years of age,' thus transcending the obligation to
support as the basis for the presumption.
In Boyd v. Boyd,' the most recent case in this field, title was
made to a husband and wife by entirety. It is not clear what
amount each contributed to the price. It was shown that the
wife contributed at least part of the price in money saved by
her, from funds furnished her by the husband for household ex-
penses. The husband later conveyed his title to his wife. Subse-
quently the wife sold the property and deposited the money to
her separate account in a bank. She then drew out this money
and bought the property in controversy, taking title in her name
only. The husband claimed a resulting trust. The court decreed
an equal division of the property. The case may be correct on
the ultimate facts, but it is difficult to square the decision on the
facts contained in the opinion. The amount contributed by each
is uncertain. If they each had a half interest in the first prop-
erty the conveyance by the husband to the wife would constitute
a transfer of his half and leave her the full owner.
As to all of the rules stated thus far, the West Virginia de-
cisions, with the possible exception of Boyd v. Boyd, ' are in com-
1 7 Mayer v. Johnson, 101 W. Va. 522, 133 S. E. 154 (1926).
'' See collection of cases in note (1923) 26 A. L. R. 1106, 1126.
19 Hamilton v. Steele, 22 W. Va. 348 (1883); Deck v. Tabler, 41 W. Va.
332, 23 S. E. 721 (1895); Lockhard & Ireland v. Beckley et a., 10 W. Va.
87 (1877); Ludwick v. Johnson, 69 W. Va. 499, 68 S. E. 117 (1910).
2Ogupra n. 13.
2 Supra n. 13.
0 109 W. Va. 766, 155 S. E. 303 (1930).
='$upra n. 22,
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plete conformity with the vast majority in both England and the
United States. Variations exist, however, in the situation where
a wife pays the purchase price and title is taken in the husband's
name. That transaction is held in the majority of jurisdictions
to raise a resulting trust in favor of the wife.2' A wife is under
no legal obligation to provide-for her husband and hence that
major reason for presuming a gift is not involved. This pre-
sumption of a trust rather than a gift, moreover, is based on com-
mon experience. The wife may have many reasons for causing
title to be placed in her husband, for example, his more convenient
management of her separate estate. Whether in fact experience
authorizes the presumption has not been supported by data.
The cases in which the wife was purchaser and the husband
grantee, are dealt with in chronological order to show the varying
view of the court.
In McGinnis v. Curry' the wife gave the husband money
with which the husband bought land in Missouri taking title in
himself. Later the husband sold the Missouri land and with the
proceeds bought land in West Virginia, again taking title in him-
self. The husband became involved and deeded this property to
the wife. In a creditor's bill to levy upon the land it was held that
the property belonged to the husband. The court said there was a
presumption of a gift from the wife to the husband. In this case
the wife with full knowledge of the facts had made no claim to the
property before the conveyance to her.
In Berry v. Weidmane the husband used the wife's money to
purchase property, title to which he caused to be conveyed to him-
self. The court held that unless it was shown that the wife in-
tended to make a gift of the money to her husband or to lend it
to him a resulting trust arose. Mere lapse of time was held not
sufficient to establish the transaction as a gift. In this case the wife
had treated the property as her own and had made valuable im-
provements upon it.
In Skaggs v. Mane it was held, where a husband purchased
property with the wife's money and took title in his own name,
that a resulting trust arose in her favor in the absence of a clear
showing that she intended a gift. Again in Standard Mercantsle
Co. v. Ellis' it was held, where the husband purchased property
2Supra ni. 13.
13 W. Va. 29 (1878).
S40 W. Va. 36, 20 S. B. 817 (1894).
46 W. Va. 209, 33 S. B. 110 (1899).
S48 W, Va. 309, 37 S, E. 593 (1900).
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with the wife's money and without her knowledge or consent took
title in his own name, that a resulting trust arose. The wife was
not estopped from setting up such trust by permitting the legal
title to remain in her husband's name unless credit was knowingly
extended to the husband on the strength of his apparent ownership.
It would seem that the clear result of the decisions in these cases
is that a prima facie presumption exists that the wife intended a
purchase made -with her money to be for her benefit, and that this
presumption raises a resulting trust which can be rebutted by show-
ing that the wife intended to make a gift to her husband.
In Pickens v. Wood' the wife furnished part of the purchase
money and the husband alone took title. The court held that there
was a prima facie presumption of a gift to the husband. Again
in Whitten v. Whittene the holding was that money of the wife
invested in land in the husband's name is presumptively a gift,
and that in the absence of facts and circumstances rebutting the
presumption such as violation of a prior or contemporaneous agree-
ment to take title in the wife's name, ignorance of its having been
taken in the husband's name, subsequent expenditure of the wife's
money in improvements thereon, an effort on her part to obtain
title after discovery of its condition, control of the property as her
own against the husband, or the like, there is no resulting trust in
her favor.
In Hummel v. Marshal', although the court distinguished that
case from Whitten v. Whitte&e, its decision shows a marked ten-
dency against the presumption of a gift in such circumstances.
The court said, '!we .think a rule that permits a wife to overcome
this presumption of gift with but slight evidence best comports
with justice. This conclusion is strengthened when it is considered
that in a gr~at majority of jurisdictions in this country there is no
presumption at all of a gift where the wife's money is used by the
husband to purchase property the title to which he takes in his
own name." The presumption was rebutted in this case by show-
ing that the wife did not know title had been taken in the hus-
band's name and that the husband had told others that the prop-
erty belonged to the wife. Subsequent to this decision the court
held in Eagle v. McKowne that a trust resulted to the wife where
57 W. Va. 480, 50 S. E. 518 (1905).
70 W. Va. 422, 74 S. E. 237 (1912).
- 101.W. Va. 639,,133 S. E. 361 (1926).
" Supra n. 30.
8 IQ5 W, V, 270, 142 S. E. 65 (1928),
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property was bought with her money and title was by mistake
made to her and her husband jointly, and she accepted the deed
on the express agreement that the husband convey to her. It
seems that there still exists in the West Virginia decisions the
theory of a presumptive gift where the wife pays for land con-
veyed to the husband, but that it is a very weak presumption, and
rebuttable by the introduction of slight evidence of circumstances
showing a contrary intent.
West Virginia has held that where the price is paid by one and
title is taken in the name of a stranger under an express parol
agreement to hold in trust for the purchaser's daughter a com-
plete gift is consummated and the grantee holds the property in
trust for the daughter.' It is axiomatic that to effect a valid gift
of personal property there must be a delivery to the donee. In
this case the purchase money was not delivered by the father to
the daughter but to the vendor and then not in trust for the
daughter but in payment for the land. There could have been no
resulting trust for the daughter but a valid express trust was
doubtless created since the transaction was in substance the same
as if the vendor had first conveyed to the purchaser and he in
turn to the trustee. This decision was prior to the Revised Code
of 1931 in which it is declared in substance that any parol trust
attached to a conveyance of land is valid.' The former ruling
that parol trusts of land for the benefit of third parties but not
of the grantor were valid is now supplanted by statute providing
it is thought that this statute is applicable only to cases in which
there has been an express parol trust.
From the above decisions, it is apparent that the question of
intent of the parties is of controlling significance. When the
parties are strangers equity is also influenced by the desire to
prevent unjust enrichment or a breach of a confidential or fidu-
ciary relationship. It is where the parties are related that the
dominance of intent is most apparent, - the whole question very
largely is whether there was an express oral trust or a gift. But
for the existence of the liberal statute in West Virginia as to
creation of trusts by parol, it might be difficult to square these
cases to the policy underlying statutes of frauds. '
-DoNALD F. BLACK.
1, Hardman v. Orr, 5 W. Va. 71 (1871).
OW. VA. REV. CODE (1931) c. 36, art. 1, § 4.
"I 
' eo Scott, op. cit. supra n. .13, at 671, 672.
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